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Abstract. Social optimization problems are often used in economics to study
important issues. In a social optimization problem, the sum of individual weighted util-
ities is maximized over all feasible allocations that satisfy certain constraints. In this
paper, we provide a mechanism that determines the set of proper individual weights to
be applied to social optimization problems. To do this, we ﬁrst deﬁne for every set of
individual weights and for every social welfare function the contribution of every indi-
vidual to the total welfare through the individual’s initial endowments. We then provide
an axiomatic approach to the notion of the per unit contribution of every good and
every individual. We then deﬁne a set of individual weights to be proper iﬀ the weighted
utilities of every individual from this allocation are proportional to the contribution of
the individual to the total welfare as deﬁned by this set of weights. It is shown that
every contribution mechanism that satisﬁes these four axioms is uniquely determined
by a non negative measure on the unit interval. The selection of a speciﬁc contribution
mechanism (or equivalently the selection of a speciﬁc nonnegative measure on the unit
interval) determines for a given economy and a given set of weights a proper constrained
eﬃcient allocation and a proper set of weights. Finally, we provide several numerical ex-
amples that illustrate our methodology. When households are not ex ante identical, the
examples suggest that using the proper weights can substantially aﬀect the allocations.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: D52, D63
11. Introduction
Social optimization problems are often used in economics to study important issues. In
a social optimization problem, the sum of individual weighted utilities is maximized over
all feasible allocations that satisfy certain constraints. The allocations resulting from this
problem are thus constrained eﬃcient. Moreover, every set of individual welfare weights
deﬁnes a social welfare function and hence determines a constrained eﬃcient allocation.
Under standard assumptions, the converse is also true, namely, every constrained eﬃcient
allocation maximizes the sum of weighted utilities for some set of individual weights.
Under complete markets, the welfare theorems imply that equilibria are pareto optimal,
suggesting that one can select the particular set of individual weights for a social optimiza-
tion problem as the ones that implement competitive equilibria. Under incomplete markets,
however, it is not obvious how to determine these weights, particularly when individuals are
not ex ante identical. The purpose of this paper is to provide a mechanism that determines
the set of proper individual weights to be applied to social optimization problems. To do this,
we ﬁrst deﬁne for every set of individual weights and for every social welfare function the
contribution of every individual to the total welfare through the individual’s initial endow-
ments. We then provide an axiomatic approach to the notion of the per unit contribution of
every good and every individual, where the contribution of an individual to the total welfare
is the total contribution of his initial endowments. We then deﬁne a set of individual weights
to be proper iﬀ the weighted utilities of every individual from this allocation are proportional
to the contribution of the individual to the total welfare as deﬁned by this set of weights.
The axiomatic approach consists of four axioms that characterize an elegant family of
contribution mechanisms. The ﬁrst axiom asserts that the per unit contribution should
be independent of the units of measurement of the goods. The second asserts that if two
(or more) goods play the same role in the welfare function, they should have the same per
unit contribution. The third axiom asserts that if the welfare function can be broken into
diﬀerent components, then the per unit contribution of a given good is the sum of the per
unit contributions arising from the diﬀerent components. The last axiom guarantees that
the per unit contribution is a continuous mapping with respect to an appropriate norm.
It is shown that every contribution mechanism that satisﬁes these four axioms is uniquely
determined by a non negative measure on the unit interval. The selection of a speciﬁcc o n -
tribution mechanism (or equivalently the selection of a speciﬁc nonnegative measure on the
unit interval) determines for a given economy and a given set of weights a proper constrained
eﬃcient allocation and a proper set of weights. Last, we suggest two variants of an additional
ﬁfth axiom. The ﬁrst variant uniquely determines the Lebesque measure on the unit interval
and the second one uniquely determines the measure which concentrates the total mass on
the last point of the unit interval (one).
Finally, we provide several numerical examples that illustrate our methodology. In the
ﬁrst example, we compute the constrained eﬃcient allocations in a two period model with
incomplete markets and ex-ante diﬀerent households and we use our method mechanism to
compute proper allocations and weights. In the second, we compute the optimal taxes of a
Ramsey economy when households are ex ante diﬀerent and we ﬁnd the proper individual
2weights.
2. The Economy
Consider an economy with  goods and  agents that are indexed by  ∈  ≡ {12}.I n




















+ represents the vector of consumptions of agent  ∈  and
¡
1 ¢
is the vector of
individual consumptions. Let 
¡
¢
represent the utility function of agent  ∈ 
Assumption 1.  is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave on R
+ with  (0) = 0 for
all  ∈ .
Deﬁnition 1. Social Optimization Problem. A social optimization problem (SOP)
is one that maximizes the weighted sum of utilities  under certain constraints, where the
individual weights  =( )∈ satisfy  ≥ 0 for all  ∈  and
P
















+,  =1 
1 () ≥ 0
. . .
 () ≥ 0
For example, in a pure exchange economy with complete markets, a typical social welfare
function is of the form:







s.t.  =  (2)
where  =
P
=1  ∈ R
+ and  =
P
=1  ∈ R
+ are the vectors of aggregate endowments
and allocations respectively. In this example, the constraint is linear and  is a function
of aggregate endowments only (the distribution of endowments is unimportant). Hence, we
can write  () instead of 
¡
1¢
. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t () is concave
and continuously diﬀerentiable on R
+,w i t h (0) = 0.I n o t h e r S O P s 1,h o w e v e r ,t h e
constraints might not be linear or convex and the social welfare function may not be concave
or continuously diﬀerentiable.
This paper provides a method to compute the contribution of a good and/or an individual
to aggregate welfare. The method is justiﬁed by an axiomatic approach described in detail
in the following section. Here, we take the contributions as given and provide an application
that illustrates the usefullness of those contributions. In particular, we consider the question
of determining the welfare weights  to be used in the SOP. We postulate the following
1For example, when markets are incomplete or in optimal Ramsey taxation problems.
3principle: welfare should be allocated to individuals according to their contribution and the
welfare weights are chosen to satisfy this principle. Speciﬁcally, we will deﬁne proper welfare
weights (and corresponding proper allocations) to be such that fraction of aggregate welfare
received by an individual equals the fraction the individual contributes.
T om a k et h e s es t a t e m e n t sm o r ep r e c i s e ,w ei n t r o d u c es o m en o t a t i o n .L e t
 () be
the per unit contribution of good  =1  held by agent  ∈  to social welfare  given
initial endowments .2 Deﬁne the total contribution of agent  ∈  to be  • () ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 2. Proper Allocation and Weights. Consider a SOP with weights
 =( )∈ and let ∗ ()=
¡
∗1 () ∗ ()
¢
∈ R
+ be a maximizer. The weights  and








 •  ()
 •  ()
(3)
That is, the proper weights and allocations are such that the weighted utility of  relative
to  must equal the relative contributions of  and 






∈  (∗ ())
=
 •  ()
P
∈  •  ()
(4)
Our next goal to deﬁne properly the contribution of every agent to the total welfare.
3. Axiomatic Approach for the Contribution Mechanism
In this section, we develop an axiomatic approach for the contribution mechanism. To
simplify notation, we let  =  be the total number of goods. Goods are diﬀerentiated
along two dimensions depending on the type of good ( =1 ) and the owner of the good
( ∈ ). Let  =( 1 ) be the vector of initial endowments, where  =(  − 1) + 
represents the initial endowment of agent  ∈  and good  =1 .I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w e
suppress the subindex  and write  () for a typical social welfare function.
We denote by R the  dimensional Euclidian space, by R
+ the nonnegative orthant
and by R
++ the positive orthant of R.W el e tF be the set of all social welfare functions
 which are deﬁned on R
+ such that (1)  is continuously diﬀerentiable on R
+ and (2)
 (0) = 0.N a m e l y ,  can be any continuously diﬀerentiable function which arises from a
SOP of some economy.
In general, we do not know how to characterize the set F of social welfare functions. This
set depends on the economies under consideration and, in particular, on the set of constraints
of each economy. However, if the set of economies includes the pure exchange economies with
complete markets, we can easily prove (see Lemma 1 below) that F contains F
,w h e r e
F
 is the set of all functions on R
+ such that (1)  is continuously diﬀerentiable and
concave on R
+ and (2)  (0) = 0. In other words, the lemma states that every continuously
diﬀerentiable function which is concave and satisﬁes  (0) = 0 is a social welfare function.3
2Note that, in principle, the per unit contribution of the same good can diﬀer depending on which individual
holds it.
3The proof of Lemma 1 as well as all other results are provided in the Appendix, unless otherwise stated).
4Lemma 1. F
 ⊆ F.
Our next goal is to deﬁne for each  ∈ F and for each  =1  the per unit
contribution of every good and of every agent  ∈  to the total welfare  ().
Deﬁnition 3. Contribution Mechanism. A contribution mechanism is a rule or a
function (··) which associates with every ,w i t he v e r y ∈ F and every  ∈ R
+ an
element () in R,w h e r e
()=( 1 ()  ())
and  () for  =1 is the per unit contribution of the  good to the total welfare
of society.
Below, we present four requirements (axioms) that restrict the set of contribution mech-
anisms to an elegant family.
Axiom 1: Rescaling. Let  ∈ F.L e t ∈ R
++ and let  ∈ F be deﬁned by
 (1 ) ≡ (11 )
Then, for each  ∈ R
+ and each  =1 
 ()= (11 )
This axiom requires that the contributions should be independent of the units of mea-
surement of the goods. The idea can be illustrated in a simple one good economy. Consider
an economy where only apples are consumed, let  denote apple allocations in kilos and
let the social welfare function be  ().L e t () denote the social welfare function of an
identical economy where  is measured in grams. Clearly,  ()=(1000). Then, ()
is the per kilo contribution in an economy initially endowed with  kilos of apples. On the
other hand, (1000) is the per gram contribution in an economy initially endowed with
1000 grams (= kilos) of apples. Since the two economies have the same initial endowment
and are identical otherwise, the axiom requires that the per kilo contribution equals 1000
times the per cent contribution
() = 1000(1000)

















5This axiom asserts that if two (or more) goods are the "same", in the sense that they
play the same role in the welfare function, they should have the same per unit contribution.
For example, suppose that there are two goods, say blue and red cars. Assume that the
welfare associated with a blue car is the same as the one associated with a red car and let
 be a one variable function indicating the welfare of a total number of cars (regardless of
whether they are blue or red). Then the previous statement can be formulated as follows:
 (1 2)=(1 + 2). In this case, the axiom requires that the contribution of a blue car
is the same as the one of a red car, namely 1 ((1 2)) = 2 ((1 2)) = (1 + 2).
Axiom 3: Additivity. Suppose that ,  and  belong to F.I ff o re v e r y ∈ R
+
 ()=()+ ()
then for every  ∈ R
+
()=()+()
This axiom asserts that if the welfare function  can be broken into the sum of two
components  and , then the per unit contribution of the  good is the sum of the per
unit contributions arising from  and .
Axiom 4: Positivity. Let  and  be in F and let  ∈ R
++. Suppose that  − is
non decreasing for all 0 ≤  ≤ ,w h e r e ≤  means that  ≤  for all  =1 .T h e n
() ≥ ()
The idea in Axiom 4 is that, if increasing initial endowments results in a larger increase in
welfare in economy  compared to economy , then it must be that the per unit contribution
in the former is larger than in the latter. Given the additivity axiom, the positivity axiom
guarantees that for every  ∈ R
+ the per unit contribution (·) is continuous in the
1-norm.
Theorem 1 characterizes the set of all contribution mechanisms that satisfy the previous
four axioms.
Theorem 1. (··) is a contribution mechanism on F = ∪∞
=1F which satisﬁes Axioms
1-4 iﬀ there exists a unique nonnegative measure  on ([01]ß) (ß is the set of all Borel
subsets of [01]) such that for each ,f o re a c h ∈ F and for each  ∈ R






()(),  =1  (5)
That is, (5) deﬁnes a one to one mapping from all the nonnegative measures on ([01]ß)
onto the set of all contribution mechanisms satisfying the four axioms.
For an intuitive interpretation of the formula (5) suppose that there is only one good
and the initial endowment is . One can compute the increase in welfare resulting from a
marginal increase in the initial endowment at zero. This computation can be carried out
6for successively larger initial endowments until  is reached. In this way we will have the
marginal addition in welfare arising from each additional unit of endowment at every step
of the way. The contribution of the good to the welfare function will be the average of these
marginal eﬀects weighted by the measure . In mutli-good environments, these computations
will be made on the diagonal (i.e. only at points where the endowments of diﬀerent goods
are at a ﬁxed proportion).
The axiomatic approach, as it stands, does not specify what measure  should be used.
However, slight modiﬁcations of the axioms can uniquely determine this measure. In what
follows, we provide two such modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst one adds the requirement that the
contributions add up to the total welfare, Axiom 5. In that case, the unique measure 







(),  =1 
This measure would average the marginal eﬀects on welfare along the diagonal [0].T h e
second one replaces positivity (Axiom 4) with a stronger requirement (Axiom 4’). In that
case, the unique measure is the atomic probability measure whose whole mass is concentrated






(),  =1 
According to this measure, the contribution of the th good is simply equal to its marginal
eﬀect on welfare at . The additional axioms together with the resulting Propositions are
presented below.





This axiom asserts that the sum of contributions should be equal to the total welfare.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique contribution mechanism which satisﬁes axioms








For a proof of Proposition 1, see Young (1985).
Axiom 4’. Let  ∈ F and let  ∈ R
++.I f  is non decreasing at each  ≤  in a
neighborhood of  then  () ≥ 0,f o r1 ≤  ≤ .
This axiom requires that contributions are nonnegative at  even if  is nondecreasing
only in a neighborhood of . Note that axiom 4’ implies axiom 4 so that by theorem 1 a
contribution mechanism that satisﬁes axioms 1,2,3 and 4’ is of the form (5). But the available
set of mechanisms is now smaller.
7Proposition 2. A contribution mechanism (··) satisﬁes Axioms A1-A3 and A4’ iﬀ
there exists a constant  ≥ 0 s.t. for each ,e a c h ∈ F
 and each  ∈ R
+ with  6=0
()=∇ ()







where ([01]) = 0 and (1)  0. The measure  is an atomic measure which is fully
concentrated at  =1 .
For a proof of Proposition 2, see Samet and Tauman (1982).
Axiom 5 is natural when the question is the allocation of welfare. Axiom 4’ on the
other hand is quite strong. The interest in this one arises from the fact that it yields a
contribution mechanism and proper allocations that are familiar. Speciﬁcally, in a context
where the fundamental welfare theorems apply, the proper allocation will be Walrasian with
respect to the initial endowments. Put diﬀerently, our method of determining the welfare
weights will yield the same answer as the well-known Negishi method. This is reassuring
and provides further support to the use of proper weights when the welfare theorems do not
apply and the Negishi method cannot be applied.
A similar result can be obtained for the case of the Lebesgue measure (under Axiom 5),
albeit under the additional assumption of homogeneity. This is the objective of the following
section.
4. Characterization of Proper Allocations in Homogeneous Economies
This section characterizes proper allocations in economies where the individual utilities and
the constraints are homogeneous. We consider pure exchange economies with complete
markets and show that in these markets a constrained eﬃcient allocation is proper iﬀ it
is a Walrasian allocation (a competitive equilibrium allocation with respect to the initial
endowments). In a later section, we will provide examples of proper allocations for non-
homogeneous economies (whether these have complete or incomplete markets).
Proposition 3. Consider a pure exchange economy with complete markets. Suppose
that the utilities ()∈ are all homogeneous of degree  for some 0.T h e na na l l o c a t i o ni s
proper iﬀ it is a Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium with respect to the initial endowments
.
5. Applications
We are interested in economies with incomplete markets where, to our knowledge, there is no
currently available method for determining welfare weights. The objective of these examples
is illustrative, with two goals in mind. To show how our methodology can be applied and
to hint on the potential importance of the choice of weights for economic applications. We
consider an optimal taxation problem under incomplete markets where households are not
ex ante identical. We focus on the Lebesgue measure.
85.1. The Economy. The model has two periods,  =1 2 a n dt w ot y p e so fa g e n t st h a t
are indexed by  ∈ {12}.I n t h e ﬁrst period, households receive an (certain) exogenous
endowment  and they decide how much to consume 1 and how much to save .T h e r e
is a continuum of households of type 1 (receiving 1)o fm e a s u r e1 and a continuum of
households of type 2 (receiving 2)o fm e a s u r e1 − 1. Thus households are not ex ante
identical, unless 1 = 2. In the second period, households work and consume. Consumption
2 equals income which arisesfromtwo sources, capital and labor. Capital income is 
where  is the gross rateof return. Labor income is uncertain from the point of view of
period 1, since the endowment of labor in period 2  is stochastic. In particular, this
endowment is high with probability 2 and low otherwise:
 =
(
 with prob. 2
 with prob. 1 − 2
)
Households derive utility from consumption and from government expenditures 2 which
they treat as exogenous. Each period, households choose consumption demand as well as





2(2() 2)+( 1− 2)(2() 2)
¤
subject to
1 +  = 
2()=( 1 − ) + 
2()=( 1 − ) + 
We assume the government levies proportional taxes on capital that are known to the
household ex ante.Letting  denote aggregate capital and assuming a balanced government
budget, 2 = . The aggregate capital supply in this economy is derived from the saving
decisions of households as follows:
 ≡ 11 +( 1− 1)2
Moreover, aggregate labor supply is exogenous and given by
 ≡ 2 +( 1− 2)
Both aggregate capital and labor are rented by a single ﬁrm at prices  and  respectively.
They are used as inputs to a constant returns to scale production function ().T h e
ﬁrm maximizes the period proﬁts, leading to the following aggregate demand functions:
 = ( )
 = ( )
95.2. Equilibrium. Given government policy (2), the competitive equilibrium is char-
acterized by the following conditions:










1 +  = 
2()=( 1 − ) + 
2()=( 1 − ) + 
 = 2
 = (11 +( 1− 1)22 +( 1− 2))
 = (11 +( 1− 1)22 +( 1− 2))
together with goods market clearing which is satisﬁed by Walras’Law.
5.3. Ramsey Problem. We consider an optimal (Ramsey) taxation problem where the
government chooses the optimal capital income tax (and government spending) in order to
pick the competitive equilibrium that maximizes aggregate welfare. Aggregate welfare is
a weighted average of individual welfare where each type’s welfare is weighted by .T h e









2((1 − ) + )+( 1− 2)((1 − ) + )
¤¤
where
˜ 11 +˜ 22 =1
˜ 2 =1 − ˜ 1 =1− 1
s.t.
0(−)= (1 − )
¡
2((1 − ) + )+( 1− 2)((1 − ) + )
¢
 = (11 +( 1− 1)22 +( 1− 2))
 = (11 +( 1− 1)22 +( 1− 2))
5.4. Numerical Results. We make some assumptions on preferences and technology in
order to obtain numerical results. We assume a linear production function
()= + 
implying that  and  are exogenous. To ensure that individual utility at zero equals zero,
which is assumed in the previous sections, we choose an exponential utility4
()=1 − −
()=1 − − + 
¡
1 − −¢
4Our method can be easily applied to utilities that do not vanish at zero by applying a suitable transfor-
mation.






















where the parameter 0 governs the preference for the government good relative to the
consumption good. Note that households of diﬀerent types are assumed to have the same
utility. Although it would be interesting to consider heterogeneity in preferences, for the
purposes of this example we assume that households only diﬀer in their initial endowments
.Table 1 below provides the parameter values used in the numerical computation.
Table 1: Parameter Values
    2 1   1 2
099 051 51 0 50 50 41 62 1 8
Note that welfare weights  do not add up to one, so we normalize them and report their
normalized values 1
1+2. Figure 1 below displays how the optimal tax varies as a function
of the (normalized) welfare weight of type 1.
As reﬂected by the ﬁgure, the optimal tax varies signiﬁcantly with the welfare weight of
type 1 agents. In particular, the lower is the welfare weight of type 1, the higher is the capital
income tax. In this particular example, the normalized weight on the poor turns out to be
considerable lower than 0.5 and the optimal tax rate is around 0.64. The graph also reﬂects
that if the government gives the same weight to both agent types then the optimal tax rate
is equal to around 0.5. This example, while just being illustrative, suggests that choosing





P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Let  ∈ F
 and consider a pure exchange economy with 
physical goods where for all  ∈  and for all  ∈ R
+  () ≡  ().L e t be the vector
of aggregate initial endowments and let  = 1
 for  ∈ . Since agents have the same utility,






































 = ,  =1 
≤  ()


































 = ,  =1 
=  ()
Thus,  ∈ F implying that F
 ⊆ F.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .Suppose that (··) is a contribution mechanism on F = ∪∞
=1F
which satisﬁes Axioms 1-4. The idea of the proof is to extend the deﬁnition of (··) from F
to F,w h e r eF = ∪∞
=1F
 and F
 is the set of all continuously diﬀerentiable functions
 on R
+ such that  (0) = 0.5 Then we prove (5) for every  ∈ F and hence for every
 ∈ F.
By Lemma 1, we know that F
 ⊆ F and hence (··) is deﬁned on F
 for all
 =1 2We start by extending (··) from F
 to F
 − F
, which is the set of all
functions  which are the diﬀerence between any two functions in F
. We then show that
every polynomial on R is in F
 − F
. This will allow us to extend (··) to F using
the fact that every  ∈ F
 can be approximated (in the 1-norm) by polynomials on R.
Suppose that  = 1 − 2,w h e r e ∈ F
 for  =1 2.F o ra l l ∈ R
+ deﬁne
()=(1) − (2) (6)
We now show that (6) is well deﬁned. Namely, it does not depend on the representatives 1
and 2. Suppose that 1, 2, 1 and 2 are all in F
 such that 1 − 2 = 1 − 2.W e
need to show that
(1) − (2)=(1) − (2) (7)
5Note that not every  ∈ F
 is a social welfare function. Furthermore, F
 contains functions which may
take negative values.
12Note that 1 + 2 ∈ F
 and 1 + 2 ∈ F
.S i n c e1 + 2 = 1 + 2 we have that
(1 + 2)=(2 + 1)
By the additivity axiom on F
,
(1)+(2)=(2)+(1)
implying (7), as claimed. We now have (··) deﬁned on F
 − F
 and it is easy to show
that axioms A1-A4 are satisﬁed on this class.
The following lemma shows that () for  ∈ R
++ is uniquely determined by the
behavior of  on the box 
=1 [0 ] ≡ . In other words, it is enough to restrict ourselves
to the box  generated by 
Lemma 2. Suppose that  and  are in F
 and let  ∈ R
++.I f ()=() for all
 ∈ R
+ s.t.  ≤  then
()=()
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .S i n c e  ()=() for all 0 ≤  ≤  then  () − () and





Deﬁnition 4. Denote  =  the box generated by  ∈ R
++.L e tF
 () be the set of
all continuously diﬀerentiable, concave functions  with  (0) = 0 restricted to .N a m e l y ,
F
 () is generated by F
 by simply restricting the domains of every function  ∈ F

to .
By Lemma 2, for every  ∈ R
++, (··) is deﬁned on F
 ()−F
 (),w h e r e = .






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯







with  ≥ 0 and non negative integers 1,..., (with at least one of them positive) is in
F
 − F
 for every  ∈ R




 −  (1 )
6Note that k·k1 is indeed a norm, since kk1 =0implies that  =0due to the fact that  (0) = 0.
13is concave. Since
P





 − (1 ) ∈ F
 − F

We next observe that every polynomial is the sum and diﬀerence of a ﬁnite number of
monomials. Since F
 − F
 is a linear space we also conclude that every polynomial
is in F
 − F
. Next, we note that every function  ∈ F
 () can be approximated
by polynomials in the 1−norm (see Hilbert (1953)). Namely, there exists a sequence of
polynomials ( (·))
∞
=1 on R s.t.
k − k1 → 0,a s →∞ .
We will show that () converges, as  →∞and we will deﬁne () as the limit
of (), and the extension of () to F (and hence to F) will be completed.
Lemma 3. Let  ∈ R
++ and let ()

=1 be a sequence of polynomials on R s.t.
kk1 → 0,a s →∞on .T h e n () → 0,a s →∞ , for every  6=0with
0 ≤  ≤ .
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .Since kk1 → 0,a s →∞  on ,b y( 8 ) and its partial
derivatives converge to zero in the sup norm for every  ∈ R
+ with  ≤ . This implies that
for every 0 and for  suﬃciently large both  (1 )+
P
=1  and 
P
=1  −

















− () ≥ 0
















Note also that for every  ∈ F we have that ()=() (using the additivity
axiom this is true for any rational number 0 and by the positivity axiom it is easy to















=1 ) does not depend on  we conclude that lim→∞ ()=0 . ¥
The following lemma shows that lim→∞ () exists if ()

=1 converges to any
continuously diﬀerentiable function.
14Lemma 4. Let  ∈ R
++ and let  = . Suppose that  ∈ F
 and let ()
∞
=1 be a
sequence of polynomials on R s.t. k − k1 → 0,a s →∞ ,o n.T h e nlim→∞ ()
exists for every  6=0with 0 ≤  ≤ .
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . ()
∞
=1 is a Cauchy sequence since it converges (to ). That
is, for every 0 there exists 0 s.t. whenever  ≥  then k − k1 on
.L e t  =  (
P
=1 ) and let  =
P






.S i n c e()
∞
=1 is a Cauchy sequence there exists 0 s.t.
 ≥  implies k − k1  (10)
By (10),  −  and the partial derivatives of  −  are smaller than  in the sup norm.
Hence, if  ≥  both( − )(1 )+
P
=1  and 
P
=1 −( − )(1 )
are non decreasing on . By the positivity and the additivity axioms (which apply to
F
 − F














By (11) and the additivity axiom
−  () −  () 
or
| () −  ()| 
Consequently, ( ())
∞
=1 is a Cauchy sequence on the real line. Since the real line is a





=1 converges to a ﬁnite limit. ¥
We are now ready to extend (··) to F
.L e t  ∈ F
 and let  ∈ R
+ with  6=0 .
Suppose that  ∈ R




+ s.t. k − k1 → 0,a s →∞ ,o n.B yL e m m a4(())
∞
=1 has a limit.
Deﬁne
()= l i m
→∞
() (12)
We need to show that (12) is well deﬁned and does not depend on the representative sequence
()
∞
=1. Suppose that also the sequence ()
∞
=1 of polynomials converges to  on b  =  b ,
where b  ∈ R
++ and  ≤ b .L e t =  ∩ b .T h e nk − k1 → 0 and k − k1 → 0 as
 →∞ ,o n.T h u s ,
k − k1 = k −  +  − k1 ≤ k − k1 + k − k1 → 0 as  →∞ ,o n
and
k − k1 → 0 as  →∞ ,o n
B yL e m m a3 ,w eh a v et h a tlim→∞ ( − ) → 0,a s →∞ .B yL e m m a4 ,lim→∞ ()











()= l i m
→∞
() as  →∞ ,
and (12) is well deﬁned.
It is easy to verify that (), which is now deﬁned for every  ∈ F
,s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst
two axioms of rescaling and consistency. In addition, () is linear, namely
( + )=()+()
for all real numbers  and  and all  and  in F
. Furthermore, (·) is weakly positive.
Namely, for  ∈ R
++ if  ∈ F
 and  is non decreasing on  then () ≥ 0.
We are now ready to complete the proof using the technique in Samet and Tauman
(1982). A sketch of the proof is provided in what follows. We next prove the theorem for
the one dimensional case (or the single product market).
Lemma 5. There exists a unique non negative measure  on ([01]ß) such that for






P r o o fo fL e m m a5 .We ﬁrst prove the lemma for the case with  =1 .L e t [01] be the
set of all continuous real valued functions on [01]. There is a one to one linear mapping 
from  [01] onto F1





for all  ∈  [01] and all 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Observe that (·1) deﬁnes a functional  on  [01]
by7
 ()=(1),  ∈  [01] (15)
The additivity and positivity of (·1) on F1
 implies the additivity and the positivity
of  on  [01]. Note that positivity means that () ≥ 0 whenever  ≥ 0 This follows
from (14) since  ≥ 0 implies that  is non decreasing in F1
 ([01]). Moreover, additivity
of  [01] implies that
 ( + )=()+()
Using the additivity and positivity of  it is easy to verify that  ()=() for each
real number . Indeed ﬁrst let  = 1
























Thus ()= (). Suppose next that  = 
,w h e r e and  are positive integers.













() we have that
7Note that  is a continuously diﬀerentiable function and ()(0)=0. Hence  ∈ F
1







(). Next suppose that  = − 




























and therefore ()=() for every rational . Finally, let  be a real number. Let
()
∞
=1 be an increasing sequence of rational numbers and let ()
∞
=1 be a decreasing se-
quence of rational numbers s.t.  ↑  and  ↓ ,a s →∞ .S i n c e ( − ) ≥ 0 and
( − ) ≥ 0 by the positivity of  we get that
 ( − ) ≥ 0 and ( − ) ≥ 0
By the additivity of 
()= () ≤  () ≤ ()=()
Letting  →∞we have that
() ≤ () ≤ ()
so that ()=().C o n s e q u e n t l y , is linear, namely
( + )= ()+()
for any real numbers  and any  ∈  [01].S i n c e is a positive functional on  [01]
the Rietz Representation Theorem implies that there exists a unique nonnegative measure















When we vary  over all functions in  [01] we vary  over all F1
 ([01]).T h e r e f o r e ,
by Lemma 2 (16) holds for every  ∈ F1
. Next, let 0 and let  ∈ F1
.D e ﬁne















and the proof of the lemma is complete.¥
Lemma 6. For any polynomial  on R of the form
(1 )=( 11 +  + )







()(),f o r =1 
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .Suppose that   0 for all  =1 .L e t : R → R be deﬁned by














































By (17) and (18)
(1 )= (11 ) (20)
By (17), (19) and (20) and by the rescaling axiom,
















and the proof is complete for all   0 and  =1 . It is easy to extend the proof to the
case in which  ≥ 0 for  =1 .¥
Lemma 7. For any polynomial  on R and every  ∈ R











 (1 ) (21)
18where  is of the form given in Lemma 6 (see Aumann and Shapley (1974), p. 41). By the





























To complete the proof of the theorem, let  ∈ F
.L e t ∈ R
+ and let  ∈ R
++ s.t.
 ≥ . Then there exists a sequence of polynomials ()
∞
=1 on R s.t. k − k1 → 0 as
 →∞on ,w h e r e = .B yd e ﬁnition and by Lemma 5, for every , 1 ≤  ≤ ,
 ()= l i m
→∞













This completes the proof of the theorem asserting that for every contribution mecha-
nism (··) which satisﬁes the four axioms there exists a unique non negative measure  on
([01]ß) s.t. for every  ∈ R







Finally, it is easy to verify that each such mechanism satisﬁes the four axioms. This completes
the proof of the theorem. ¥




+ is a proper allocation.
Then in particular  is Pareto eﬃcient, namely, there exists ()∈ s.t.:














By the second welfare theorem,  is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the case where









19It is easy to verify (and well known) that up to a positive factor

























































































This implies that  is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to .
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